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THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATION OF THE DORMANT
COMMERCE CLAUSE
Michael S. Knoll* and Ruth Mason**
In 2015, a sharply divided Supreme Court decided a landmark
dormant Commerce Clause case, Comptroller of the Treasury of
Maryland v. Wynne. Wynne represents the Court’s first clear
acknowledgement of the economic underpinnings of one of its main
doctrinal tools for resolving tax discrimination cases, the internal
consistency test. In deciding Wynne, the Court relied on economic
analysis we provided in an amicus brief. This Article explains that
analysis, why the majority accepted it, why the dissenters’ objections
to the majority’s reasoning miss their mark, and what Wynne means
for state taxation. Essential to our analysis and the Court’s decision in
Wynne is the idea that states are capable of discriminating not only
on an inbound basis, but also on an outbound basis, and that the
Commerce Clause prohibits discrimination on either basis. To aid in
explaining our position, this Article introduces the term “retentionism” as an analogue to protectionism. Whereas taxes or regulations
are protectionist when they discourage outsiders from engaging in
economic activities within a state, taxes or regulations are retentionist
when they discourage in-state economic actors from engaging in outof-state activities. As we show, the tax struck down in Wynne was both
protectionist and retentionist.
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INTRODUCTION
N Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne,1 an unusually
aligned and closely divided Supreme Court struck down a Maryland
state tax regime as inconsistent with the dormant Commerce Clause of
the U.S. Constitution.2 Commentators hailed Wynne as the most important state tax decision in decades, and even the most important decision of the 2014–15 Term.3 How is it possible that a state tax case has a
claim to be the most important decision in a Term that saw landmark de-

I

1

135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015), aff’g sub nom., 64 A.3d 453 (Md. 2013).
Justice Alito wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Kennedy, Breyer, and Sotomayor. Justice Scalia wrote a dissent, which Justice Thomas
joined in part. Justice Thomas wrote his own dissent, in which Justice Scalia partially joined.
Finally, Justice Ginsburg wrote the principal dissent, joined by Justices Kagan and Scalia. Id.
at 1791.
3
Gary Thompson, Op-Ed: A Tax Case (Yes, Tax) was Last Term’s Blockbuster, Nat’l L.J.
(Aug. 31, 2015), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202735954030/OpEd-A-TaxCase-Yes-Tax-Was-Last-Terms-Blockbuster (highlighting Wynne as the standout in what he
described the Term’s “epic docket”). See also Brannon P. Denning & Norman R. Williams,
Wynne: Lose or Draw?, 67 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 245, 245 (2014) (describing Wynne as
“the most important state tax case since . . . 1992” (citing David Sawyer, Tax Observers Say
IBM and Wynne are Cases to Watch, Tax Analysts, St. Tax Notes Mag., Sept. 1, 2014, at 558
(quoting tax practitioner’s perspective that Wynne was “probably the most important U.S.
Supreme Court case . . . in the last 30 years”))).
2
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cisions on marriage equality,4 redistricting,5 lethal injection,6 and the interpretation of the Affordable Care Act?7
Before Wynne, because there was no clear description of tax discrimination that applied in every case, courts and litigants relied on intuition
to identify discrimination, which predictably led to claims that the concept was unprincipled. Some of the harshest criticism came from the Supreme Court itself. As far back as the 1940s, the Court referred to its tax
discrimination jurisprudence as a “quagmire”8 and “tangled underbrush.”9 Such criticism has not ebbed. For example, in his dissent in
Wynne, Justice Scalia described the “glaring defect” of the dormant
Commerce Clause as “its lack of [a] governing principle.”10 He criticized the Court’s doctrine for its “instability,”11 calling it a “bestiary of
ad hoc tests and ad hoc exceptions.”12 Likewise, prominent commentators have described the Court’s tax nondiscrimination doctrine as “confused and inconsistent,”13 as having a “wild west quality to it”14 and
“characterized by meaningless distinctions, encrusted rules, and a lack
of principled analysis.”15
Such criticism is typical of tax nondiscrimination standards, which
require courts to balance state-tax-autonomy interests against the value

4

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015).
6
Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015).
7
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
8
Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457–58 (1959); see also
Wardair Can., Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 17 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) (referring to “the cloudy waters of this Court’s
‘dormant Commerce Clause’ doctrine”).
9
Nw. States Portland Cement Co., 358 U.S. at 457 (quoting Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co.,
311 U.S. 435, 445 (1940)).
10
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1809 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
11
Id. Justice Scalia describes the Court’s practice in this area dating back to the 1870s as
tending “to revamp the doctrine every couple of decades upon finding existing decisions
unworkable or unsatisfactory.” Id. at 1808.
12
Id. at 1809.
13
Tracy A. Kaye, Tax Discrimination: A Comparative Analysis of U.S. and EU Approaches, 7 Fla. Tax Rev., no. 2, 2005, at 47, 80.
14
Id. at 91 (quoting Professor Kirk Stark).
15
Id. at 91 n.278 (quoting Professor David F. Shores, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce—Quiet Revolution or Much Ado About Nothing?, 38 Tax L. Rev. 127, 128 (1982)).
5
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of market integration.16 In Wynne, the Supreme Court clarified its approach to this balancing under the dormant Commerce Clause by renewing its commitment to its own internal consistency test for identifying
unconstitutional discrimination.17 Importantly, the Court announced that
the test should apply broadly to all kinds of taxes levied against all kinds
of taxpayers.18 The test is simple and powerful. When faced with a
dormant Commerce Clause challenge to a state’s tax rules, the reviewing
court should assume that all fifty states apply the challenged rule. If, under the fifty-state-harmony assumption, cross-border commerce would
bear more tax than purely in-state commerce, then the state tax is internally inconsistent and unconstitutionally discriminatory.
Under the regime challenged in Wynne, Marylanders paid county tax
of up to 3.2 percent on their income, regardless of whether they earned it
inside or outside Maryland.19 Against the county tax due on income
earned outside the state, Maryland offered no credits for other states’
taxes. These rules resulted in unrelieved double taxation for the Wynnes.
At the same time, Maryland imposed a tax of 1.25 percent on the Maryland income of residents of other states.20
When we universalize this Maryland tax regime, in-state income is
always taxed at 3.2 percent, but cross-border income is always taxed at
4.45 percent. The Maryland regime is therefore internally inconsistent.
The Court concluded that because Maryland’s internally inconsistent tax
regime burdened cross-border commerce more than in-state commerce,
it violated the Constitution.21
After developing the internal consistency test in the 1970s and early
1980s,22 the Court repeatedly narrowed the application of the test, leav16

See generally Ruth Mason & Michael S. Knoll, What is Tax Discrimination?, 121 Yale
L.J. 1014 (2012) [hereinafter Tax Discrimination] (reviewing criticisms of nondiscrimination
standards in various legal contexts, focusing mainly on E.U. tax law).
17
See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1804.
18
Id. at 1802–04.
19
Id. at 1792.
20
Id. at 1803.
21
Id. at 1803–04. We show that, in addition to being protectionist, the Maryland tax regime was what we call retentionist; it discouraged residents from engaging in out-of-state
activities. Retentionist policies are the mirror image of protectionist policies, and they similarly distort cross-border commerce.
22
See Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983) (articulating requirement of internal consistency); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 272–74,
277–78 (1978) (applying analysis similar to the internal consistency test to conclude that a
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ing commentators to wonder about its continued relevance.23 Prior to
Wynne, the Supreme Court had not struck down a state tax as internally
inconsistent in thirty years.24 Wynne not only removed doubts about the
continued relevance of the test, but it acknowledged, for the first time,
that economic analysis supports using internal consistency to identify
unconstitutional discrimination in tax cases.
Of the fourteen amicus briefs filed in Wynne, two presented the economic case for the internal consistency test.25 While each of the two
briefs made the case in its own way, both made essentially the same
economic argument. We wrote one of those briefs, and the other was
written by eight prominent tax economists (the Tax Economists’ Brief).
The Wynne majority repeatedly referenced both briefs in its decision.26
We argued in the brief, as we have in our academic work, that the
economic principle that motivates legal prohibitions on tax discrimination is what we call “competitive neutrality” or “a level playing field.”27
Competitive neutrality is the idea that states should not use their tax systems to distort the competitive advantages of residents of different
states. Our earlier work provided support for that doctrinal conclusion in

state was free to adopt an apportionment formula that differed from the formula used by forty-four of the forty-six states imposing a corporate tax).
23
Walter Hellerstein, Is “Internal Consistency” Dead?: Reflections on an Evolving Commerce Clause Constraint on State Taxation, 61 Tax L. Rev. 1, 2 (2007) (claiming pre-Wynne
case law “reconfigured internal consistency doctrine and requires a rethinking of its more
expansive applications”).
24
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1821 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
25
See Brief of Michael S. Knoll and Ruth Mason as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 9–24, Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015) (No. 13485) [hereinafter Knoll Mason Brief]; Brief of The Tax Economists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 23–27, Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct.
1787 (2015) (No. 13-485) [hereinafter Tax Economists’ Brief]. In addition to these two
briefs, friends of the court filed twelve other briefs in Wynne. Comptroller v. Wynne, SCOTUSBlog, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/comptroller-v-wynne/. The Solicitor
General filed a brief for the United States in support of Maryland. Brief for the United States
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135
S. Ct. 1787 (2015) (No. 13-485) [hereinafter Solicitor General’s Brief].
26
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1802, 1804, 1806.
27
See Knoll Mason Brief, supra note 25, at 9–18. For our prior academic work on the economic foundations of tax nondiscrimination rules, see Tax Discrimination, supra note 16;
Ruth Mason & Michael S. Knoll, Waiting for Perseus: A Sur-Reply to Graetz and Warren,
67 Tax L. Rev. 375 (2014) [hereinafter Perseus]; Ruth Mason & Michael Knoll, A Brief SurReply to Graetz and Warren, 123 Yale L.J. Online 1 (2013), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/
forum/a-brief-sur-reply-to-professors-graetz-and-warren.
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both the E.U. and U.S. contexts.28 We showed in our amicus brief that
the internal consistency test is a simple and predictable guideline for determining whether a state’s tax rate regime is competitively neutral. We
therefore urged the Supreme Court to uphold the decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals to strike down the challenged Maryland law because it was internally inconsistent.29 The Tax Economists’ Brief took
the same position.30 In Wynne, the Supreme Court not only renewed its
commitment to the internal consistency test, but the majority made clear
that a reason it endorsed internal consistency was the congruence between the test and the economic analysis that we and the tax economists
presented in our amicus briefs.31
Although the Wynne majority put the internal consistency test on a
firmer theoretical footing by referring to the economic analysis in the
two briefs, the Court did not repeat that economic analysis in its opinion.32 Similarly, while acknowledging the majority’s reliance on the
briefs, the dissent declined to address (or refute) the economic analysis
we offered.33 This makes it more difficult to conclusively draw the lesson from Wynne that the dormant Commerce Clause’s nondiscrimination
principle promotes competitive neutrality. Adding complexity, the parties in Wynne framed the central issue in the case as whether the
dormant Commerce Clause requires a state to relieve double taxation.34
These two notions—double taxation and tax discrimination—are not
identical, and conflating them gives rise to persistent confusion that per-

28

See Tax Discrimination, supra note 16, at 1085–97, 1106–15 (dealing mostly with E.U.
cases, but also arguing that the same principle was at work in the U.S. jurisprudence). See
also Ryan Lirette & Alan D. Viard, Putting the Commerce Back in the Dormant Commerce
Clause: State Taxes, State Subsidies, and Commerce Neutrality, 24 J. L. & Pol’y 467, 495–
500 (2016) (providing in-depth analysis of the U.S. doctrine).
29
Knoll Mason Brief, supra note 25, at 18–24.
30
Tax Economists’ Brief, supra note 25, at 23–27.
31
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1804.
32
Id. at 1801–06.
33
Id. at 1822 n.7 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The majority faults the dissents for not ‘disput[ing]’ its ‘economic analysis,’ but beyond citation to a pair of amicus briefs, its opinion
offers no analysis to dispute.”) (alteration in original) (quoting id. at 1804).
34
Brief for Respondents at i, 1819, 2527, Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne,
135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015) (No. 13-485) [hereinafter Wynnes’ Brief]; Brief for the Petitioner at
i, 27, Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015) (No. 13-485)
[hereinafter Maryland Comptroller’s Brief].
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vades dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, including the principal dissent in Wynne.35
This Article seeks to explain the significance of Wynne by exploring
why the majority ruled as it did, why the dissenters’ objections to the
majority’s reasoning miss their mark, and what Wynne means for state
taxation. The first Part of this Article describes the facts of Wynne. Part
II provides a brief introduction to the dormant Commerce Clause and the
Court’s tax discrimination jurisprudence. It also explores our theory that
the dormant Commerce Clause promotes competitive neutrality. In Part
III, we show that the internal consistency test accurately identifies state
tax rate structures that violate competitive neutrality. As a result, we argue, as we did in our amicus brief, that the Court’s internal consistency
doctrine has a firm economic foundation. We also show that the Maryland tax regime challenged in Wynne was internally inconsistent. Part IV
describes the Wynne majority’s endorsement of the internal consistency
test, which relied on the economic analysis in our amicus brief and that
of the tax economists. In Part V, we critically examine the dissenting
Justices’ main criticisms of the Court’s opinion, especially the dissent’s
arguments against the internal consistency test. We show that when the
Court’s majority opinion is properly understood as addressing tax discrimination, rather than double taxation, the dissenting Justices’ objections lose their force. We then conclude.
I. THE FACTS OF WYNNE
The facts of Wynne are simple. Brian and Karen Wynne, a married
couple residing in Maryland, owned stock in Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc. (Maxim), a Maryland corporation engaged in business
throughout the United States.36 Because it was an S corporation, Maxim
paid no federal income tax; instead, Maxim passed through to its share35

See Ruth Mason, Made in America for European Tax: The Internal Consistency Test, 49
B.C. L. Rev. 1277, 128489 (2008). A similar problem arises in the context of personal tax
benefits, where courts have sometimes held that a cross-border taxpayer must receive benefits, such as the personal exemption, exactly once, somewhere. Our work shows that maintenance of competitive neutrality does not require fidelity to the “once, somewhere” principle.
Tax Discrimination, supra note 16, at 1083 (concluding that “[c]hecking for double recoveries or double denials is no more effective a way to identify violations of competitive neutrality than is comparing absolute tax rates”); see also Perseus, supra note 27, at 42122
(providing numerical example).
36
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1793.
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holders all items of income and expense (including state taxes paid).37
Maxim’s shareholders, including the Wynnes, reported Maxim’s prorata income on their personal federal income tax returns.38
State individual income taxes work similarly to national income taxes—specifically, two states typically have jurisdiction to tax an item of
cross-border income. The “source state” has jurisdiction to tax income
produced within its borders. At the same time, the “residence state” has
jurisdiction to tax all the income of its residents, no matter where earned.
Because these two jurisdictional bases overlap, cross-border income
may be subject to double taxation. Typically, the residence state relieves
such double taxation by crediting taxes assessed by the source state
against the tax due at residence.
As residents of Maryland, the Wynnes had to pay Maryland tax on
Maxim’s income, no matter where Maxim earned it.39 They also had to
pay taxes on Maxim’s income to the source states where Maxim earned
it.40 The dispute arose because Maryland did not credit taxes the Wynnes
paid to other states against their Maryland tax on the same income.41
Thus, they paid more tax on their income from other states than they
would have paid on the same income, had they earned it in Maryland.42
Phrased this way, it is easy to see why the parties, justices, and commentators originally understood this case to challenge the constitutionality of
double taxation. Later, we will differentiate discrimination and double
taxation, but for now we provide a little more detail on the challenged
Maryland regime, which contained the following elements:43
37

Id. at 1793 n.1.
Maryland follows federal tax law in treating S corporations as pass-through entities. Md.
State Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 64 A.3d 453, 457–60 (Md. 2013), aff’d sub
nom. Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015).
39
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1792–93.
40
Id. at 1792.
41
Id.
42
See id.
43
Maryland formally divided its individual income tax into two portions: a progressive
“state” portion and a flat “county” portion, which varied by county. Id. In 2006, the year in
question, the “state” portion had a maximum rate of 4.75%, and the “county” portion varied
depending upon the county from 1.25% to 3.2%. See Md. Code. Ann., Tax-Gen. § 10-105(a)
(1998) (amended 2008); Md. Code. Ann., Tax-Gen. § 10-106(a) (2010); Frey v. Comptroller
of the Treasury, 29 A.3d. 475, 521, 521 n.5 (Md. 2011). The State collects both portions of
the tax, but it remits the “county” portion to the counties. See Md. Code Ann., Tax-Gen.
§ 10-103 (2010); Frey, 29 A.3d. at 483, 521. Maryland allows its residents a credit against
their “state” tax liabilities for taxes paid to other states up to the full amount of their “state”
38
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For residents:
1. On income earned in Maryland, tax of 1.25% to 3.2%, depending on the county of residence (domestic tax or Td).44
2. On income earned in other states, tax of 1.25% to 3.2%, depending on the county of residence (outbound tax or To), with no
credit for other states’ taxes.45
For nonresidents:
3. On income earned in Maryland, tax of 1.25% (Maryland calls
this the Special Non-Resident Tax or SNRT; we also call it the
inbound tax or Ti).46
4. On income earned in other states, no tax.
The Wynnes resided in Howard County, where the tax rate was
3.2%,47 so the Wynnes paid tax of 3.2% on their income from domestic
and outbound activities. Figure 1 schematically represents the challenged Maryland tax regime for Howard County.
Figure 1. Maryland County Tax Regime

ACTIVITY IN
ANOTHER STATE

MARYLAND
RESIDENT

RESIDENT OF
ANOTHER STATE

Outbound Tax (To)
3.2%

N/A

tax liability (a full credit). Md. Code Ann., Tax-Gen. § 10-703(c) (2010). Maryland, however, does not allow its residents any credit against their “county” tax liabilities for taxes paid
to other jurisdictions. See id. § 10-703(a). As a result, the Wynnes’ challenge implicated the
“county,” rather than the “state” tax, and for simplicity we therefore deal only with the
“county” portion of the tax.
44
Md. Code Ann., Tax-Gen. § 10-103(a)(1) (2010); Frey, 29 A.3d at 521.
45
Md. Code Ann., Tax-Gen. §§ 10-103(a)(1), 10-703(a) (2010); Frey, 29 A.3d at 521.
46
Md. Code Ann., Tax-Gen. § 10-106.1(a)–(b) (2010); Frey, 29 A.3d at 521.
47
William Donald Schaefer, Comptroller of Maryland, Maryland Withholding Tax Facts:
January 2006–December 2006, http://taxes.marylandtaxes.com/Resource_Library/Tax_Pub
lications/Tax_Facts/Withholding_Tax_Facts/Withholding_tax_facts_2006.pdf.
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II. TAX NONDISCRIMINATION AS COMPETITIVE NEUTRALITY
The Commerce Clause of the Constitution grants Congress the power
“[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes.”48 By its own terms, the Commerce
Clause does not restrict state governments, but rather grants power to
Congress. The dormant Commerce Clause is “the doctrine that the
commerce clause, by its own force and without national legislation, puts
it into the power of the Court to place limits upon state authority.”49 Although courts and scholars have endlessly debated whether the Commerce Clause should be interpreted to restrict state action even in the absence of direct congressional action, the Court has long interpreted the
Commerce Clause to limit state action.50
Scholars and jurists recognize that dormant Commerce Clause doctrine aims to develop and maintain a smoothly functioning national marketplace.51 Thus, for example, in 1949 the Court wrote that “[o]ur [economic] system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer
and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that
he will have free access to every market in the Nation.”52 Under the
Court’s doctrine, state taxes violate the dormant Commerce Clause when
they discriminate against or unduly burden cross-border commerce.53
48

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Felix Frankfurter, The Commerce Clause Under Marshall, Taney and Waite 18 (1937).
50
Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179 (1995).
51
Underlying the Commerce Clause is the framers’ “conviction that in order to succeed,
the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had
plagued relations among the Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of Confederation.” Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 32526 (1979).
52
H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949).
53
See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977) (describing the
modern approach to resolving dormant Commerce Clause challenges to state taxes, where
“decisions have considered not the formal language of the tax statute but rather its practical
effect, and have sustained a tax against Commerce Clause challenge when the tax is applied
49
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The dormant Commerce Clause prevents the states from enacting economic policies, especially tariffs, that advantage in-state commerce over
cross-border commerce.54
The most important preliminary in any dormant Commerce Clause
tax inquiry is to acknowledge that a state does not violate the dormant
Commerce Clause merely by discouraging cross-border commerce. All
taxes discourage commerce. But many taxes that discourage crossborder commerce do not offend the Constitution. For example, high tax
rates in one state discourage commerce in that state by both residents
and nonresidents. Such distortions are inevitable in a federal tax system
that allows states autonomy to set their own tax rates. The dormant
Commerce Clause only restrains certain distortions of cross-border
commerce; this Part describes our view on the specific kind of distortion
the dormant Commerce Clause forbids, namely, distortions to what we
call competitive neutrality. Wynne makes clear that a majority of the Supreme Court shares our view.55
In prior work, we focused primarily on the European Union when
making the doctrinal case for a competitive neutrality interpretation of
tax discrimination, although we also discussed the dormant Commerce
Clause.56 Although we argued that doctrine reveals competitive neutrality to be the value undergirding the dormant Commerce Clause, we did
not invent the idea of competitive neutrality out of thin air. We based
our approach to tax discrimination on a solid economic foundation: The
age-old economic principle of comparative advantage, which holds that
an economic actor (for example, a nation, corporation, or individual)
will specialize in those activities where it enjoys a comparative ad-

to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not
discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the
State” (citations omitted)).
54
West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 192–93 (1994) (striking down a tax that
functioned as a tariff and describing tariffs as “[t]he paradigmatic example of a law discriminating against interstate commerce”).
55
See infra Part IV.
56
See Tax Discrimination, supra note 16, at 1085–97 (addressing the E.U. cases); id. at
1106–14 (addressing the U.S. state cases). Among other examples, we cited West Lynn
Creamery, in which the Supreme Court struck down under the dormant Commerce Clause a
state tax regime because it “neutraliz[ed] the advantage possessed by lower cost out-of-state
producers” and “artificially encourag[ed] in-state production even when the same goods
could be produced at lower cost in other States.” West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 193–94.
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vantage and will avoid those activities where it has a comparative disadvantage.
In the absence of tariffs, quotas, taxes, or other potential distortions,
the activities an economic actor specializes in are determined not by absolute advantage, but rather by comparative advantage.57 Policy instruments, such as tariffs, can distort economic activity by changing an actor’s perceived (in our case, after-tax) comparative advantage relative to
her actual comparative advantage. When we translate the idea of comparative advantage from the familiar context of tariffs on goods and services to the less familiar context of taxes on income, earning income
takes the place of production of goods and services. Whereas tariffs distort which goods and services are produced in a state, discriminatory income taxes distort in which state a person earns income.58
In our view, every discriminatory tax results in two distortions to
where people earn income, and these distortions run in opposite directions. When the state’s tax regime undermines the comparative advantage of nonresidents who earn income within the state relative to residents who earn income within the state, economists refer to the regime
as protectionist. Economists have not invented a special term to describe
the distortion that happens when a state’s tax regime undermines the
comparative advantage that residents have over nonresidents on income
earned outside the state. We refer to such distortions as retentionist. Protectionist taxes keep outsiders out; retentionist taxes keep insiders in.
The Wynnes’ complaint involved the retentionist impact of Maryland’s tax regime—specifically, the Wynnes argued that Maryland discouraged them from earning out-of-state income.59 But, as we explain
57

Our approach is also based on modern portfolio theory, especially the theory of portfolio
choice in an environment with taxes. See, e.g., Michael J. Brennan, Taxes, Markets Valuation and Corporate Financial Policy, 23 Nat’l Tax J. 417, 417, 42022 (1970).
58
Our approach is also closely related to the literature on capital ownership neutrality
(CON). See Tax Discrimination, supra note 16, at 1051–72. A tax system is said to promote
CON when it does not distort who owns capital. Id. at 1053–54. In contrast, a tax system is
said to promote capital export neutrality (CEN) when it does not distort where (in which jurisdiction) taxpayers invest their capital. Id. at 1043. Our argument is that the dormant
Commerce Clause is concerned with the “who” question, not the “where” question. When
we refer to discouraging cross-border commerce relative to in-state commerce (and the
shorthand “discouraging interstate commerce”), we refer to distortions of ownership, not location.
59
Md. State Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 64 A.3d 453, 460 (Md. 2013), aff’d
sub nom. Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015).
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later, all discriminatory taxes have both protectionist and retentionist
impacts. While the Wynnes complained about the retentionist impact of
Maryland’s tax regime, the same tax regime also generated a complementary protectionist effect. Although the protectionist effect of the
Maryland tax regime was not at issue in Wynne, we can describe it. Because the Maryland tax regime discouraged Marylanders from earning
out-of-state income, it upset the comparative advantage nonresidents
may otherwise have had over Marylanders when competing for work
and investments in Maryland. That effect is protectionist. Indeed, at least
some nonresident taxpayers understood this effect well enough to challenge the same Maryland regime as protectionist in Frey v. Comptroller
of the Treasury, a case decided four years prior to Wynne.60 We discuss
Frey later.61
In contrast with our comparative-advantage approach, it is common
and (to most non-economists) intuitive to assume that the impact of taxes on competition can be understood by comparing absolute tax rates.
That intuition is wrong. Assume, as in Wynne, that we are trying to determine the impact of Maryland’s tax regime on cross-border commerce.
To do so, we need to look beyond Maryland to alternative investment
opportunities open to Marylanders and residents of other states. The
competitive position of an economic actor considering working or investing in a particular market is determined by simultaneously comparing tax rates across both taxpayers and economic opportunities. Crucial
to this economic analysis is the idea, widely accepted in economics, that
people make decisions based on comparisons of their options across different markets relative to their competitors’ options across the same
markets.62 Thus, to identify the impact of state taxes on economic actors,
we must compare

60
Frey v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 29 A.3d. 475, 484, 493 (Md. 2011), cert. denied
132 S. Ct. 1796 (2012) (mem.).
61
See discussion accompanying infra notes 73–80.
62
See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 57 (developing after-tax CAPM); Myron Scholes et al.,
Taxes and Business Strategy 14243 (4th ed. 2009) (explaining tax clienteles); David Ricardo, On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817) (developing the principle of
comparative advantage).
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(1) how an economic actor is taxed in the particular market under
consideration relative to how that actor is taxed in alternative
markets
with
(2) how that actor’s competitors are taxed in the particular market
relative to the alternative markets.63
Thus, we must compare two comparisons. And accordingly, even if
Maryland taxes nonresidents at a lower rate than residents on income
earned in Maryland, it does not follow that Maryland provides nonresidents with a tax-induced competitive advantage over residents for income earned in Maryland. Rather, an actor has a competitive advantage
in a particular market over a second actor only if the share of pre-tax income the first actor retains in that market relative to the share of pre-tax
income the actor retains in other markets exceeds that same ratio for the
second actor.64
Our approach is also consistent with commonly observed behavior.
Residents of high-tax states (such as California and New York) hold
many taxable investments despite being taxed more heavily on those
same investments than potential investors from lower-taxed states (such
as Florida). If absolute tax rate advantages were determinative, residents
of high-tax states would be discouraged from holding investments in
low-tax jurisdictions and from holding investments, such as equities and
debt, which are taxed only where the holder resides.
As this short discussion suggests, and as our prior work shows in detail, deciding whether a tax system is neutral between in-state and crossborder commerce (is “competitively neutral,” in our parlance) requires
consideration of how a state taxes both residents and nonresidents on
both in-state and out-of-state income.65

63

Tax Discrimination, supra note 16, at 106072; Perseus, supra note 27, at 43652.
Tax Discrimination, supra note 16, at 106072.
65
Perseus, supra note 27, at 43652 (demonstrating numerical derivation of these principles).
64
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Our principal result can be expressed as requiring that all taxes must
be assessed on either a uniform source or a uniform residence basis.66 A
source tax is uniform if it applies at the same rate and on the same base67
to both residents’ and nonresidents’ income from the state.68 A residence
tax is uniform if it applies at the same rate and on the same base to residents’ in-state and out-of-state income.69 Accordingly, if a state taxes on
both a source and residence basis, it must apply both source and residence taxes to its residents’ in-state income.70 More generally, if a tax
system can be decomposed into a series of uniform source and residence
taxes, then it is competitively neutral, and conversely, if it cannot be decomposed into uniform source and residence taxes, then it is not competitively neutral.
The uniformity rule can be used to evaluate any tax discrimination
claim, whether it involves a challenge to the tax rates, the tax base, or
both. In the limited situation, as in Wynne, where a taxpayer challenges
only the tax rates (not the tax base), the above logic reduces to a simple
mathematical formula. The requirement that a state must apply both its
source and residence taxes to its own residents (coupled with a recognition that the dormant Commerce Clause prohibits discouraging crossborder commerce relative to in-state commerce but does not prohibit encouraging such cross-border commerce relative to in-state commerce)
implies that the tax rate assessed by a state on its residents’ domesticsource income, Td, must equal or exceed the combined tax imposed on
domestic residents’ out-of-state income, To, and nonresidents’ in-state
income, Ti. Arithmetically, this can be written as Condition 1:

𝑇𝑑 ≥ 𝑇𝑜 + 𝑇𝑖 − (𝑇𝑜 × 𝑇𝑖 )71

66

Tax Discrimination, supra note 16, at 106074 (describing uniformity requirements for
taxes not to distort competition).
67
“Tax base” refers to the rules for calculating taxable income.
68
See Tax Discrimination, supra note 16, at 1064.
69
Id. at 1055.
70
See id. at 106072; Lirette & Viard, supra note 28, at 54546.
71
The last term on the right side of the inequality represents the interaction between the
tax laws of the source and residence states. It assumes that the residence state would allow a
deduction from taxable income (not a credit against tax due) for the taxes assessed by the
source state. For a numerical example, see infra note 134 and Figure 3.
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That is, the tax rate a state applies to residents’ domestic income must
equal or exceed the sum of the tax rate it applies to residents’ out-ofstate income and the tax rate it applies to nonresidents’ domestic income
less the product of those two rates. If a state’s tax rates do not satisfy
Condition 1, its tax system discourages cross-border competition.72 Notice that Condition 1 does not specify the rates; rather, it specifies the relationship among the rates. A state may set its tax rates high or low. And
a state may set any two of the three tax rates in Condition 1 as it chooses. However, the choice of those two rates restrains the third. Thus, the
dormant Commerce Clause prevents a state from setting its tax on domestic income independently from its tax on cross-border (inbound and
outbound) income.
In contrast with our approach, when litigating disputes under the
dormant Commerce Clause, states and taxpayers often argue that the
presence or absence of tax discrimination can be conclusively determined by comparing the tax rate the challenged state imposes on a resident taxpayer to the tax rate the state imposes on a nonresident taxpayer.
Advocates of this view thus believe that tax discrimination determinations can be made by comparing absolute tax rates.
Frey v. Comptroller of the Treasury,73 the case mentioned earlier, illustrates why this approach is wrong. The Maryland Court of Appeals
decided Frey in Maryland’s favor just two years before it decided
Wynne against Maryland.74 Frey involved a challenge to the exact same
Maryland tax regime at issue in Wynne, only in Frey, the taxpayer was a
nonresident who earned income in Maryland and challenged Maryland’s
inbound tax rate.75 In other words, Frey complained about the protectionist aspect of the Maryland regime, while the Wynnes complained
about its retentionist aspect. On our theory, those two effects are complementary, and both are present in every discriminatory tax.
In defending Maryland’s tax regime in Frey, the Maryland Comptroller took the position that tax discrimination could be conclusively de72

See Perseus, supra note 27, at 436–41 (providing formal derivation of nondistortion
conditions).
73
29 A.3d. 475 (Md. 2011).
74
Compare id. at 520 (holding that Maryland’s SNRT was constitutional), with Md. State
Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 64 A.3d 453, 470 (Md. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015) (holding that the same tax
regime that had been challenged and upheld in Frey was unconstitutional).
75
Frey, 29 A.3d at 484.
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termined by comparing Maryland’s tax on resident taxpayers to its tax
on nonresident taxpayers. The Comptroller argued that because Frey was
a nonresident, the court should compare Maryland’s domestic tax rate to
Maryland’s inbound tax rate.76 The Maryland Court of Appeals agreed
that this was the correct comparison. Having accepted the Comptroller’s
comparison and because the inbound rate (Ti = 1.25%) was lower than
the domestic rate (Td = 3.2%), the Maryland Court of Appeals never
considered the impact on cross-border commerce of the other component of Maryland’s tax regime, namely, Maryland’s outbound tax rate
(To = 1.25%).77
In Wynne, the Maryland Comptroller made nearly the same argument.
However, since the Wynnes were Maryland residents with out-of-state
income, the Comptroller argued that this time the relevant comparison of
absolute tax rates was between Maryland’s domestic tax rate (Td =
3.2%) and Maryland’s outbound tax rate (Ti = 3.2%).78 To the Comptroller, Maryland’s inbound tax rate in Wynne, like its outbound tax rate in
Frey, was simply irrelevant.
The Comptroller’s framing in each case represents a simple comparison of absolute tax rates. Expressed mathematically, in Frey the Comptroller argued that the dormant Commerce Clause requires that Td ≥ Ti.
In Wynne, the Comptroller argued that the dormant Commerce Clause
requires that Td ≥ To. Combining these two arguments, we arrive at the
Maryland Comptroller’s notion of the nondiscrimination condition,
Condition 2:

𝑇𝑑 ≥ 𝑇𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝑑 ≥ 𝑇𝑜 .
Thus, combining Frey and Wynne, we can see that Maryland argued
that as long as each of its inbound and outbound tax rates taken alone
did not exceed its domestic tax rate, Maryland did not discriminate.
What Maryland ignored was that the burden its tax system places on
cross-border commerce compared to the burden its tax system places on
in-state commerce depends on comparing the domestic tax rate to the
cumulative burden Maryland places on cross-border commerce. That

76

Id. at 510.
See id. at 483–84.
78
Maryland Comptroller’s Brief, supra note 34, at 14–15; see Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1792.
77
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cumulative burden can be evaluated only by considering Maryland’s inbound and outbound taxes together. Maryland’s argument is based on a
mistaken implicit assumption: That the competitiveness of two taxpayers
relative to one another in a specific market depends solely on absolute
advantages, that is, on how those two taxpayers are taxed solely by
Maryland.
Although the Maryland Comptroller’s reasoning may be intuitive,
economic analysis shows that it is wrong. Absolute tax rate comparisons
across competitors in the contested market (such as that offered by the
Comptroller in both Wynne and Frey) are misleading. By disaggregating
its inbound and outbound taxes, Maryland was able to persuade the
Maryland Court of Appeals in Frey that the Maryland regime did not offend the Constitution.79 But when the exact same regime was challenged
in Wynne, the same Maryland court found it unconstitutional.80
The difference between Frey and Wynne is that in Wynne the Court of
Appeals used the internal consistency test.81 As we show below, the internal consistency test automatically aggregates a state’s taxes on inbound and outbound commerce, and, therefore, it prevents a state from
obscuring discrimination against cross-border commerce in disparate elements of its tax regime.82 The internal consistency test works because it
tests for whether a state’s tax regime upsets comparative advantage.
Thus, it moves the inquiry away from the kinds of absolute comparisons
offered by the Maryland Comptroller in Frey and Wynne.
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMPETITIVE NEUTRALITY AND THE
INTERNAL CONSISTENCY TEST
Writing separate amicus briefs, we and the tax economists urged the
Court to apply the internal consistency test in Wynne.83 We (and they)
advocated for the test for the same reason: That test greatly aids courts

79

Frey, 29 A.3d at 520.
Md. State Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 64 A.3d 453, 471 (Md. 2013), aff’d
sub nom. Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015).
81
Compare Frey, 29 A.3d. at 515–16, 520 (not applying internal consistency test), with
Wynne, 64 A.3d at 463–67 (applying internal consistency test).
82
See infra Part III.
83
Knoll Mason Brief, supra note 25, at 2, 4, 10; Tax Economists’ Brief, supra note 25, at
23–27.
80

COPYRIGHT © 2017 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2017]

Dormant Commerce Clause

327

in determining whether state tax regimes violate competitive neutrality.84
Our recommendation was out of step with contemporary views of the
utility of the internal consistency test and three decades of Supreme
Court jurisprudence, which had consistently narrowed its application.
Before Wynne, at best, commentators regarded the internal consistency
test as merely duplicating other doctrinal principles.85 Other commentators were far more critical of the test, including Justice Scalia, who in
Wynne described the internal consistency test as unprincipled “ad hocery.”86 Because the virtue of the internal consistency test in identifying
state tax regimes that violate competitive neutrality was unappreciated, it
was far from obvious that the Court would redouble its commitment to
the test in Wynne. The opposite seemed possible because the Court had
repeatedly narrowed the test since formally adopting it in 1983.87 Indeed,
so precarious was the doctrine after a series of decisions narrowing it
that in 2007, Walter Hellerstein, a leading expert on state taxation, wrote
an article entitled, “Is Internal Consistency Dead?”88
The Court’s clearest statement of the internal consistency test came in
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Jefferson Lines, Inc.:
84
Knoll Mason Brief, supra note 25, at 9–28; Tax Economists’ Brief, supra note 25, at 23–
27; see also Tax Discrimination, supra note 16, at 1023 (arguing “that the principle of nondiscrimination in taxation should be understood as promoting competitive neutrality”); Lirette & Viard, supra note 28, at 509–16 (describing the Court’s adoption of internal consistency in Wynne as a step forward).
85
See Walter Hellerstein, Is “Internal Consistency” Foolish?: Reflections on an Emerging
Commerce Clause Restraint on State Taxation, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 138, 188 (1988) (concluding that the Supreme Court could have decided cases in which it applied the internal consistency test by appeal to older dormant Commerce Clause doctrines rather than inventing a
new test that “may introduce confusion and uncertainty in an area of the law that has had
more than its fair share of both”). Such analysis fails to recognize that the internal consistency test does a better job than other doctrines (such as fair apportionment) of effectuating the
economic principle behind the dormant Commerce Clause, namely, competitive neutrality.
86
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1809 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
87
Before Wynne, the Supreme Court had not invalidated a state tax for lack of internal
consistency since a pair of decisions issued on the same the day in 1987. See Am. Trucking
Ass’ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 269, 284 (1987) (invalidating as internally inconsistent a
state’s fixed fee on trucks operating in-state); Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Wash. Dep’t of Revenue,
483 U.S. 232, 248 (1987) (invalidating as internally inconsistent a state’s manufacturing and
wholesaling tax). But see Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 545 U.S. 429,
437–38 (2005) (upholding an internally inconsistent state tax regime); see also Hellerstein,
supra note 23, at 2 (analyzing several cases narrowing the application of the internal consistency test since 1987, but ultimately concluding that “reports of its demise are premature”
even after the 2005 American Trucking case).
88
Hellerstein, supra note 23.
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Internal consistency is preserved when the imposition of a tax identical to the one in question by every other State would add no burden to
interstate commerce that intrastate commerce would not also bear.
This test asks nothing about the degree of economic reality reflected
by the tax, but simply looks to the structure of the tax at issue to see
whether its identical application by every state in the Union would
place interstate commerce at a disadvantage as compared with commerce intrastate.89

Thus, the internal consistency test directs a court to assume that every
state enacts the challenged state’s tax regime, and then it asks whether,
under such hypothetical harmonization, cross-border commerce bears
more tax than purely in-state commerce.
Figure 2 shows how income would be taxed if every state (represented here by New Jersey) adopted the Maryland tax regime as employed in
Howard County:

89

514 U.S. 175, 185 (1995).
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Figure 2. Maryland Tax under the Internal Consistency Test
MARYLAND
RESIDENT

NEW JERSEY
RESIDENT

ACTIVITY IN
NEW JERSEY

4.45%

3.2%

ACTIVITY IN
MARYLAND

3.2%

4.45%

As Figure 2 shows, the Maryland tax regime is internally inconsistent
because under hypothetical harmonization, domestic income (the unshaded quadrants) would be taxed at only 3.2%, whereas cross-border
income (the shaded quadrants) would be taxed at 4.45%.90 Applying the
internal consistency test, the Supreme Court, like the Maryland Court of
Appeals before it, concluded that the Maryland tax regime violated the
dormant Commerce Clause.91
In urging the Court to apply internal consistency in Wynne, we noted
in our amicus brief the close similarities between the internal consistency test and both (1) our uniformity rule and (2) Condition 1. With regard
to the first similarity, the internal consistency test reveals whether the
state taxes uniformly on a source and residence basis. Uniform taxes
pass the internal consistency test; non-uniform taxes fail it. The second
similarity arises when the challenge is to a state’s system of tax rates
(without credits), as in Wynne. In such situations, the internal consistency test is equivalent to Condition 1 and to our uniformity requirement.
The equivalence of the internal consistency test to both Condition 1
and the uniformity principle is easy to see. The unshaded quadrants in
Figure 2 contain only the Maryland tax rate on domestic income (Td in
Condition 1). The shaded quadrants show the combined Maryland tax
rate on outbound (To) and inbound (Ti) income. By directing a court to
90

Cross-border income pays Ti, the inbound tax, plus To, the outbound tax. The inbound
tax is 1.25% and the outbound tax is 3.2%, for a total of 4.45%. In contrast, purely in-state
income pays only Td, the domestic tax, of 3.2%.
91
See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1792.
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strike down a state tax unless the tax rate that appears in the two unshaded quadrants (Td) equals or exceeds the rate in the two shaded quadrants,
the court is simply applying Condition 1, which is just a mathematical
statement of our uniformity principle. Thus, the internal consistency test
asks the right question, although it presents it in a conceptual, rather than
a mathematical, form.
IV. THE MAJORITY’S ENDORSEMENT OF OUR ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
We argued in our amicus brief—and a majority of the Court agreed—
that Wynne was a discrimination case. In contrast, the taxpayers, the
Maryland Comptroller, the U.S. Solicitor General’s office, and the principal dissent framed the issue in Wynne as whether the Constitution forbids double state taxation.92 This Part describes the litigants’ arguments
and the Court’s holding in Wynne.
The Wynnes and Maryland built their arguments on the same shaky
economic foundation. Both parties’ arguments derive from the mistaken
premise that one can ascertain how taxes impact competition in a given
market by comparing absolute tax rates paid by competitors in that market. The Wynnes argued that the relevant comparison was between (1)
the total tax rate (both the source state tax rate and the residence state tax
rate) they actually paid on cross-border commerce and (2) the tax they
would have paid on purely domestic commerce.93 Because Maryland did
not credit source state taxes, Maryland taxpayers who had income from
other states paid higher total taxes on their out-of-state income than they
would have paid on an equivalent amount of Maryland income.94 In the
92
Wynnes’ Brief, supra note 34, at i (posing the question presented as “[w]hether a state
tax that exposes interstate commerce to double taxation is saved from invalidation under the
Commerce Clause merely because the State imposes the tax upon its own residents”); see id.
at 14–27 (analyzing Wynne as a double tax case); Maryland Comptroller’s Brief, supra note
34, at 26–32 (same); Solicitor General’s Brief, supra note 25, at 9–19 (same). Several amici
supporting the Wynnes also framed the issue in terms of double taxation. See, e.g., Brief of
the Maryland Chamber of Commerce as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 5,
Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015) (No. 13-485) (“The
well-established dormant Commerce Clause principles protecting interstate commerce from
multiple taxation are . . . applicable . . . .”); see also Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1813–23 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (framing the case as focusing on double taxation).
93
Wynnes’ Brief, supra note 34, at 14–27.
94
This was true at least when the other state imposed income taxes, which the vast majority did. Under Maryland’s system, which did not credit other states’ taxes against Maryland
county tax, Maryland taxpayers who earned income outside Maryland would pay at least the
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Wynnes’ view, the higher taxes they paid on outbound income compared to an equivalent amount of in-state income discouraged them from
earning income outside Maryland and hence violated the Commerce
Clause.95
Maryland accepted the taxpayer’s economic frame—which involved
an absolute comparison between the tax the Wynnes paid on outbound
income and the tax they would have paid on the same amount of in-state
income. Maryland argued, however, that it met its constitutional obligation by setting its domestic and outbound taxes at the same rate.96 Maryland argued that its only obligation was to avoid taxing residents’ out-ofstate income at a higher rate than their in-state income. Any additional
taxes the Wynnes paid on non-Maryland income were assessed by
source states, not by Maryland. Thus, according to Maryland, if the
Wynnes suffered a cross-border tax disadvantage that discouraged them
from engaging in cross-border commerce, the fault lay as much with the
source state as with Maryland.97 Maryland had no control over whether
the source state taxed the Wynnes, and Maryland argued that the source
state’s tax should not preempt Maryland from taxing all its residents’ income at the same rate, no matter where they earned it.98
The Wynnes did not object to the over-simplified tax rate comparison
offered by Maryland, even though it included no comparison with taxes
paid by the Wynnes’ competitors. But to determine whether Maryland
disadvantages cross-border commerce relative to in-state commerce requires a comparison of two comparisons; namely, we must compare (1)
how Maryland taxes the Wynnes and other Maryland residents on their
Maryland income compared to their out-of-state income with (2) how
Maryland taxes nonresidents on their Maryland income compared to
their out-of-state income. This comparison is fundamental for identifying violations of competitive neutrality. Instead, the Wynnes argued that
double taxation violated the dormant Commerce Clause, and that, as
their residence state, Maryland was obliged to relieve double state taxa-

Maryland rate on those earnings, and if the other state also taxed that income, they would
pay more overall tax than they would have paid on the same dollar amount of income earned
in Maryland.
95
Wynnes’ Brief, supra note 34, at 2.
96
Maryland Comptroller’s Brief, supra note 34, at 35.
97
Id. at 27–32.
98
Id. at 26–27.
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tion.99 Thus, the Wynnes’ approach required them to argue that the Constitution included a priority rule that required the residence state to yield
to the source state.100 Source state priority to tax is well established in
international tax.101 And eminent state tax expert Walter Hellerstein argued that the Supreme Court in Wynne ought to have recognized the
source state’s priority to tax.102 But Maryland argued that because there
was no constitutionally mandated tax-priority rule, it was not clear
which state, if any, had to relieve double taxation.103 Thus, Maryland argued that its authority to tax its residents’ out-of-state income was undiminished by the source state’s authority to tax the same income.104
In our view, these double tax arguments are misdirected because they
do not go directly to the question of whether the state used its tax system
to discriminate against cross-border commerce by distorting competition
between residents and nonresidents. As described in the last Part, whether a state tax regime violates the dormant Commerce Clause depends on
its impact on cross-border commerce, not on whether it generates double
taxation. The impact of a state tax regime on cross-border commerce
cannot be understood by examining only its residence rules, despite the
arguments of both the Wynnes and Maryland. Instead, understanding the
impact of Maryland’s tax regime on cross-border commerce requires examining its entire tax regime, comprised of inbound, outbound, and domestic taxes. The internal consistency test provides a court with a simple
tool to examine the whole regime and to assess whether the regime discriminates against cross-border commerce.
Recognizing this, the Supreme Court set aside the litigants’ framing
and instead analyzed the Maryland regime under the internal consistency

99
Wynnes’ Brief, supra note 34, at 1–3; Transcript of Oral Argument at 36, Comptroller of
the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015) (No. 13-485).
100
Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135
S. Ct. 1787 (2015) (No. 13-485). Specifically, Justice Kagan asked the Wynnes’ counsel:
“[Y]ou’re not saying that . . . we should establish a priority rule as to different taxing
schemes . . . are you?” Id. Counsel for the Wynnes replied: “I think that the holdings of this
Court . . . are that in a situation where one State is taxing on the basis of residency and the
other on the basis of source, it is the State of residency that yields.” Id.
101
Tax Discrimination, supra note 16, at 1027, 1027 n.54.
102
Walter Hellerstein, Deciphering the Supreme Court’s Opinion in Wynne, 123 J. Tax’n
4, 5–6 (2015).
103
Maryland Comptroller’s Brief, supra note 34, at 31.
104
Id. at 26–44.
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test.105 Justice Alito wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Sotomayor. Citing its own
precedent, our amicus brief and that of the tax economists, and our academic work, the majority wrote:
By hypothetically assuming that every State has the same tax structure, the internal consistency test allows courts to isolate the effect of a
defendant State’s tax scheme. This is a virtue of the test because it allows courts to distinguish between (1) tax schemes that inherently discriminate against interstate commerce without regard to the tax
policies of other States, and (2) tax schemes that create disparate
incentives to engage in interstate commerce (and sometimes result in
double taxation) only as a result of the interaction of two different but
nondiscriminatory and internally consistent schemes. The first category of taxes is typically unconstitutional; the second is not. Tax
schemes that fail the internal consistency test will fall into the first
category, not the second: “[A]ny cross-border tax disadvantage that
remains after application of the [test] cannot be due to tax disparities”
but is instead attributable to the taxing State’s discriminatory policies
alone.106

When the Supreme Court applied the internal consistency test to
Maryland’s tax regime, it found the Maryland regime internally inconsistent, as had the Maryland Court of Appeals.107 Unlike the Maryland
Court of Appeals, which applied the test as a matter of doctrine, however, the Court in Wynne emphasized the connection between the test and
the economic analysis provided by us and the tax economists.108 The
Court noted that the Maryland regime “has the same economic effect as
a state tariff, the quintessential evil targeted by the dormant Commerce

105

Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1802.
Id. at 1802 (alteration in original) (citing Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644–
46 (1984); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 277 n.12 (1978); Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Comm’r of Taxes of Vt., 445 U.S. 425, 444 (1980); Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford,
305 U.S. 434, 439 (1939); Tax Economists’ Brief, supra note 25, at 23–24; Knoll Mason
Brief, supra note 25, at 18–23; and quoting Ruth Mason, Made in America for European
Tax, supra note 35, at 1310).
107
Id. at 1803–05; Md. State Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 64 A.3d 453, 464–66
(Md. 2013).
108
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1804.
106
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Clause.”109 It described the modern dormant Commerce Clause as
“look[ing] to the economic impact of the tax.”110 And it noted that
“[n]either [the Maryland Comptroller] nor the principal dissent questions
the economic bona fides of the internal consistency test.”111 In particular,
the Court acknowledged for the first time that the internal consistency
test detects violations of competitive neutrality:
[T]he internal consistency test reveals what the undisputed economic
analysis shows: Maryland’s tax scheme is inherently discriminatory
and operates as a tariff . . . . This identity between Maryland’s tax and
a tariff is fatal because tariffs are “[t]he paradigmatic example of a law
discriminating against interstate commerce.”112

In affirming the usefulness of the internal consistency test in identifying the tariff-like impact of the Maryland tax, the Supreme Court cited
our amicus brief and that of the tax economists.113 The Court later reiterated that the purpose of the internal consistency test was to identify taxes
that distort competitive neutrality when it declared that:
In this case, the internal consistency test and economic analysis . . .
confirm that the tax scheme operates as a tariff and discriminates
against interstate commerce, and so the scheme is invalid.114

The tax regime violated the dormant Commerce Clause because it upset
comparative advantage—it violated competitive neutrality and was
thereby functionally equivalent to a tariff.
Importantly, eight of the nine justices agreed that the Constitution
does not categorically forbid double taxation, and it does not contain a
priority rule that says that residence taxes must give way to source taxes.115 Thus, whereas most states avoid double taxation on a residence ba109

Id. at 1792.
Id. at 1796.
111
Id. at 1802. See also id. at 1804 (reiterating that “[n]one of our dissenting colleagues
dispute this economic analysis”).
112
Id. at 1804 (citing Tax Economists Brief, supra note 25, at 4, 9; Knoll Mason Brief, supra note 25, at 2; and quoting West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 (1994)).
113
Id.
114
Id. at 1805.
115
See id. (“We establish no such rule of priority.”); id. at 1813 (Ginsburg, Scalia & Kagan, JJ., dissenting) (“[N]othing in the Constitution or in prior decisions of this Court dictates that one of two States, the domiciliary State or the source State, must recede simply because both have lawful tax regimes reaching the same income.”).
110
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sis, as do most countries—Wynne makes clear that such an outcome is
not constitutionally required.
V. THE PRINCIPAL DISSENT
In applying the internal consistency test, the Court adopted by reference our economic analysis for determining when a state tax discourages
cross-border commerce. But the majority merely referred to the economic analysis in our amicus brief and that of the tax economists.116 It did
not describe it or explain how that analysis applied to the facts in Wynne.
Additionally, the majority borrowed language from the litigants who erroneously framed the case as asking whether double taxation was unconstitutional.117
Nor did the dissenting justices engage with the economics. Writing
for the principal dissenters, Justice Ginsburg wrote that “[t]he majority
faults the dissent for not ‘disputing’ its ‘economic analysis,’ but beyond
citation to a pair of amicus briefs, its opinion offers no analysis to dispute.”118
Justices Scalia and Kagan joined Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, much of
which reads as if the dissenting justices understood the majority opinion
to hold that the dormant Commerce Clause forbids double taxation.119
Likewise, the dissenters understood the majority to use the internal consistency test as a tool to combat double taxation.120
In this Part, we show that the dissenting justices’ arguments are not
responsive to the majority’s reasoning. The Court endorsed the internal
consistency test as a tool for determining when a state discriminates, that
is, when it violates competitive neutrality by upsetting comparative ad116

Id. at 1804.
Id. at 1801–02.
118
Id. at 1822 n.7 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing id. at 1803–04).
119
See, e.g., id. at 1810 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to “[t]oday’s enterprise of eliminating double taxation”); id. at 1816 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court struck
down the Maryland tax because it created “a risk of double taxation”); id. at 1822 n.10
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[G]iven the concern that purportedly drives the Court’s analysis,
it is mystifying why the Court sees virtue in striking down only one of the two schemes under which Bob is taxed twice.”) (emphasis omitted).
120
See, e.g., id. at 1822 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The Court characterizes internal consistency as a ‘cure,’ but the test is scarcely that, at least for the double taxation the Court believes to justify its intervention.”) (citations omitted); id. (referring to “the double tax burden
the test is purportedly designed to cure”) (quotation marks omitted).
117
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vantage.121 But the internal consistency test does not identify double taxation, and the majority did not use it for that purpose. In fact, the majority expressly disclaimed the notion that all double taxation violates the
Constitution.122 Once we understand the distinction the majority drew
between discrimination and double taxation, many of the concerns raised
by Justice Ginsburg in her principal dissent and by Justice Scalia in his
separate dissent disappear.
The dissenters make five main economic and policy (as opposed to
doctrinal) arguments against using internal consistency to identify discrimination.123 First, the test is abstract and hypothetical. Second, it does
not root out double taxation. Third, the test is deeply flawed because
Maryland could satisfy internal consistency by eliminating its inbound
tax on nonresidents, even though such relief would not help the Wynnes.
Fourth, despite the claims of the majority that the test identifies taxes
that are functionally equivalent to tariffs, the Maryland tax did not resemble or function as a tariff since it taxed in-state and cross-border income at the same rate, whereas the defining characteristic of a tariff is
that it taxes cross-border activity more heavily than in-state activity.
Fifth, the internal consistency test “boxes in” states and undercuts state
tax sovereignty. Although many of these criticisms overlap, we take
them in turn.

121

Id. at 1802–03.
Id. at 1804.
123
The dissenters also offer several interpretive and doctrinal arguments, which, if accepted, would leave no room for internal consistency. For example, Justices Scalia and Thomas
both express skepticism that the Constitution includes a dormant Commerce Clause. Id. at
1808–10 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 1811–13 (Thomas, J., dissenting). A majority of the
Court, however, has long held otherwise. The principal dissent also argues that prior cases
strongly support upholding Maryland’s tax. Id. at 1814–23 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In contrast, the Court argues that the cases strongly support striking down the Maryland tax. Id. at
1795–1807. Although we agree more closely with the majority than the dissent here, we
view many of the cases as inconsistent with one another. Along these lines, Justice Scalia
argues that a “conspicuous feature” of the Court’s tax discrimination doctrine has been “its
instability” and characterizes that jurisprudence as producing a “bestiary of ad hoc tests.” Id.
at 1809 (Scalia, J., dissenting). We do not defend the history of the Court’s tax discrimination jurisprudence, but rather offer a method that the Court can use to quickly and sensibly
determine whether a given state tax discourages interstate commerce.
122
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A. Internal Consistency is Abstract and Hypothetical
The dissenting justices (as well as commentators) have criticized the
hypothetical nature of the internal consistency test.124 The test operates
by asking the reviewing court to make a counterfactual assumption,
namely, that other states adopt the same tax system as the challenged
state. The court then determines in this hypothetical world whether
cross-border commerce bears more tax than in-state commerce. Of
course, states do not all share the same tax system, so the constitutional
inquiry strays from reality.
Critics have not made clear what disadvantages derive from the abstract and hypothetical nature of the internal consistency test. The test
might seem unusual, but we showed in Part III that it closely mirrors the
uniformity principle we developed in prior academic work, and the uniformity principle is firmly grounded in economics.125 Uniformity is the
key to nondiscrimination because it focuses on comparative advantage,
rather than absolute advantage. If we are right that the tax nondiscrimination principle in the dormant Commerce Clause aims to eliminate taxinduced distortions of comparative advantage,126 then internal consistency is an appropriate test to use because it correctly identifies tax-induced
distortions to comparative advantage. That the test takes an unusual, abstract, or hypothetical form is irrelevant.
B. Internal Consistency Does Not Prevent Double Taxation
The principal dissent and Justice Scalia criticize the internal consistency test because it fails to root out all cases of double state taxation.127 This criticism is unpersuasive because it is based on the errone-

124

Id. at 1821 n.6 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 1811 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Jasper L.
Cummings, Jr., Internal Consistency and the Federal Income Tax, 145 Tax Notes 99, 99–100
(July 6, 2015).
125
Tax Discrimination, supra note 16, 1060–74.
126
For the doctrinal case for interpreting the dormant Commerce Clause to promote competitive neutrality, see Lirette & Viard, supra note 28, at 480–83, 500–03 (labeling the competitive neutrality concept we introduced in our E.U. work as commerce neutrality and neutrality with respect to interstate commerce, to emphasize its relevance to the dormant
Commerce Clause).
127
Justice Scalia’s observation that the majority opinion does not eliminate all double
taxation leads him to conclude that the Court’s ruling leads to “imaginary benefits.” Wynne,
135 S. Ct. at 1811 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ous assertion that the majority in Wynne interpreted the dormant Commerce Clause to forbid double taxation.128
In her opinion for the principal dissent, Justice Ginsburg offered a
simple and ostensibly powerful example of the failure of the internal
consistency test to root out double taxation. She asked what would happen if one state, say, New Jersey taxed exclusively on a residence basis
and offered no credits for source taxes, while simultaneously another
state, say, Maryland taxed exclusively on a source basis? She explained
that Maryland and New Jersey would each individually satisfy the internal consistency test. However, in actual practice (as opposed to the abstraction of the internal consistency test), the combination of these systems could result in full double taxation.129 New Jersey residents with
Maryland income would be taxed twice—first by Maryland on a source
basis and then by New Jersey on a residence basis.130 Justice Scalia
made similar points.131
It is worth restating more generally the dissenters’ objection: Internal
consistency as a test of state tax discrimination would not prevent one
state from taxing exclusively on a source basis while another state taxed
exclusively on a residence basis with no credit for source taxes, even
though the simultaneous application of such systems could result in unrelieved double tax. That description of the impact of the internal consistency test is correct, but it should not be understood as a defect of the
test. Rather, it is a virtue of the test that it identifies discriminatory taxes
without invalidating nondiscriminatory taxes that raise risks of double
taxation.
The majority in Wynne understood this point. It did not hold that all
double taxation violates the Constitution. On the contrary, the Court noted the existence of a “critical distinction . . . between discriminatory tax

128
Justice Scalia erroneously characterizes the majority opinion as “[t]oday’s enterprise of
eliminating double taxation.” Id. at 1810 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
129
The combination of these schemes also could result in single taxation or “double nontaxation,” where some taxpayers are not taxed at all. Single taxation would result for Maryland residents with only Maryland income and New Jersey residents with only New Jersey
income. Double non-taxation would result for Maryland residents with only New Jersey income.
130
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1822 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
131
Id. at 1810–11 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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schemes and double taxation that results only from the interaction of two
different but nondiscriminatory tax schemes.”132
The internal consistency test preserves Member State tax sovereignty
to enact a variety of nondiscriminatory taxes, even if, in practice, those
taxes could lead to double taxation. This parsimony is important because
double taxation is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for tax
discrimination. We briefly review the distinction between double taxation and discrimination.
Obviously, a state can discriminate against cross-border commerce
without imposing double taxation. Assume, for example, Maryland is
the only state to tax, and assume that Maryland exempts residents’ outof-state income, maintains a 3% tax rate on residents’ domestic income,
and taxes nonresidents’ Maryland income at 5%. Even if no other state
imposed taxes, so that there could be no double tax, Maryland would
discriminate against cross-border commerce. Nonresidents would face a
tax-induced disadvantage compared to Maryland residents on income
earned in Maryland because nonresidents would retain proportionately
less of their income earned in Maryland relative to what they would retain of their revenue earned outside Maryland as compared to residents.133 Thus, double taxation is not a necessary condition for discrimination.
To show that unrelieved double tax need not be discriminatory, we
need to flesh out Justice Ginsburg’s example. Assume Maryland imposes only a 20% source tax, and New Jersey imposes only a 10% residence
tax. Maryland residents with New Jersey income would pay no tax; New
Jersey residents with New Jersey income would pay only the New Jersey 10% residence tax; Maryland residents with Maryland income
would pay only the Maryland 20% source tax; and New Jersey residents
with Maryland income would pay both the New Jersey 10% residence
tax and the Maryland 20% source tax, for a combined tax rate of 28%.134

132

Id. at 1804.
In our example, nonresidents retain 95% as much of their income when they earn income in Maryland rather than outside Maryland whereas residents retain 97% as much of
their income when they earn income in Maryland rather than outside Maryland. Thus, Maryland taxes provide Maryland residents with a comparative advantage over nonresidents on
income earned in Maryland.
134
This assumes that a residence state would assess its tax upon the after-source-tax income of its residents (i.e., no gross-up). Thus, the combined tax rate of 28% is calculated as
133
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To + Ti – (To x Ti): New Jersey residence tax [10%] + Maryland source tax [20%] – (New Jersey residence tax [10%] x Maryland source tax [20%]). See supra note 71.
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Figure 3. Nondiscriminatory Double Taxation
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Each of the Maryland and New Jersey tax regimes is internally consistent.136 Yet, when Maryland applies its regime at the same time that
New Jersey applies its own, different (but also internally consistent) regime, differences arise in the number of times taxpayers are taxed (none,
once, or twice) and in total tax rates they pay (0, 10%, 20% and 28%).
The test does not identify—nor should it—a tax regime as constitutionally infirm simply because it results in different taxpayers paying tax at
different absolute rates or because it results in double taxation. This is
the right result because, as we explain below,137 despite the tax differences the proposed Maryland and New Jersey regimes generate, neither
regime impairs any taxpayer’s ability to compete in either state. In other
words, although the tax regime imagined by Justice Ginsburg results in

135

See discussion in supra note 134.
The Maryland tax is internally consistent because if all states adopted the Maryland tax
system, all states would impose a 20% source tax and no other tax. Thus, both domestic and
cross-border income would be taxed at exactly 20%. Similarly, the New Jersey tax is internally consistent because if all states adopted the New Jersey tax system, all states would impose a 10% residence tax and no other tax. Thus, both domestic and cross-border income
would be taxed at exactly 10%.
137
See discussion accompanying infra notes 139–40.
136
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double taxation, it does not result in discrimination, if we understand
discrimination to be violations of competitive neutrality.
The internal consistency test generates the proper result under an interpretation of nondiscrimination that promotes competitive neutrality
and that recognizes that the impact of taxes on competitiveness depends
upon how taxes affect comparative, not absolute, advantage. The aim of
the dormant Commerce Clause is not to harmonize tax rates or ensure
that cross-border taxpayers always pay the same tax rates as domestic
taxpayers. Nor, as the majority in Wynne made clear, is it to alleviate
double taxation.138 On the contrary, the dormant Commerce Clause prevents states from using their tax systems to favor in-state commerce over
cross-border commerce. And, in the example Justice Ginsburg gave, neither the Maryland nor New Jersey system (alone or together) favors instate over cross-border commerce.
Neither state’s tax policy upsets competition because each state’s tax
regime applies uniformly. The New Jersey tax applies on a uniform residence basis; New Jersey residents pay the New Jersey tax whether they
earn domestic or outbound income. The Maryland tax applies on a uniform source basis; residents of both Maryland and New Jersey pay the
Maryland source tax on their Maryland-source income. As a result, New
Jersey residents take home 10% less after taxes than do Maryland residents with the same pre-tax income. Because that 10% difference exists
whether that income arises in New Jersey or Maryland, the New Jersey
residence tax does not distort competition between residents of New Jersey and Maryland. Similarly, everyone takes home 20% less after taxes
on each dollar of income earned in Maryland as opposed to New Jersey.
Because that same 20% difference exists regardless of whether the income is earned by a New Jersey resident or a Maryland resident, the
Maryland source tax also does not distort competition between residents
of New Jersey and residents of Maryland. Moreover, the two taxes together do not distort competition between Maryland and New Jersey residents for income in New Jersey and Maryland because both New Jersey
and Maryland residents retain 80% as much of their pre-tax income

138

Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1804.
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when they earn income in Maryland as compared with when they earn
income in New Jersey.139
Thus, competition is not distorted because residents of New Jersey
and Maryland both retain proportionately (in the example both retain
80%) as much of their before-tax income when they earn income in
Maryland as opposed to New Jersey. In order for a tax system to distort
competition, it must produce a difference in these ratios across residents
of different states.140 Expressed slightly differently, none of the hypothesized Maryland source tax, the hypothesized New Jersey residence tax,
or the combination of both taxes together distorts competition because
neither tax alone—nor both taxes in combination—distorts comparative
advantage.
Intuition might lead to the conclusion that unrelieved double taxation
always distorts competition between taxpayers, but the kind of economic
analysis we just provided shows the fallacy of that intuition. Sometimes,
double taxation upsets competition, but other times it does not. The majority understands this elusive point when it explicitly refers to nondiscriminatory double taxation.141
Indeed, what made Wynne such a conceptually difficult case was precisely that it involved discriminatory double taxation. Moreover, as both
the majority and principal dissent acknowledged, Maryland could satisfy
the internal consistency test (and eliminate the discrimination) by taking
steps that would eliminate or reduce the double taxation, such as reducing or eliminating outbound taxation, crediting foreign taxes, or eliminating inbound taxation. But Maryland could also achieve internal consistency (and eliminate discrimination) without alleviating double
taxation: For example, Maryland could raise the domestic tax rate (the
tax paid by Maryland residents on Maryland-source income) so that it
equaled the combined tax on inbound and outbound income.

139
Maryland residents retain 80% of their Maryland income and 100% of their New Jersey
income; New Jersey residents retain 72% of their Maryland income and 90% of their New
Jersey income. Because 72% is 80% of 90%, the tax systems do not change the relative
amounts kept by residents of New Jersey and Maryland for investments in each state. Thus,
the Maryland and New Jersey taxes (separately and together) do not distort competition because they do not change comparative advantage.
140
Tax Discrimination, supra note 16, at 1060–74.
141
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1804 (calling the difference between discrimination and double
taxation a “critical distinction”).
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That Maryland could satisfy the internal consistency test (and cure
discrimination) by raising the domestic tax rate, which does nothing to
eliminate or reduce double taxation, is not a problem with or a flaw of
the internal consistency test, but rather underscores that the internal consistency test in particular, and tax discrimination doctrine in general, are
about preserving comparative advantage. That is, the dormant Commerce Clause prohibits discrimination, not double taxation.
Thus, the principal dissenters are correct that the internal consistency
test will not identify all cases of double taxation, but they are wrong that
this is a problem with the test. The beauty of the internal consistency test
is its ability to distinguish between discriminatory and nondiscriminatory double taxation. Indeed, the internal consistency test does a much better job than unaided intuition in determining whether a tax system distorts competition.142 Given that the Court has interpreted the dormant
Commerce Clause to forbid only discriminatory double taxation, a test
like internal consistency that can reliably distinguish discriminatory
from nondiscriminatory double tax is invaluable.
That does not mean that the taxes in Justice Ginsburg’s example create no distortions. In our modified version of Justice Ginsburg’s example, the New Jersey tax discourages New Jersey residence, while the
Maryland tax discourages earning income in Maryland. But neither tax,
nor the combination of the two tax systems, gives a resident of Maryland
or New Jersey an edge over a resident of the other state in securing a job
or making an investment in either state. In other words, the tax regimes
(implemented together or alone) do not distort competition between residents of Maryland and residents of New Jersey for work and investment
in Maryland or New Jersey. The tax regimes do not distort competition
between the taxpayers, despite the fact that some taxpayers experience
double taxation while others do not.

142
Due to its lack of an internal consistency test (or an equivalent), the Court of Justice for
the European Union has encountered similar difficulty in determining the distortive impacts
of varying tax systems. See, e.g., Mason, supra note 35; George W. Kofler & Ruth Mason,
Double Taxation: A European “Switch in Time?” 14 Colum. J. Eur. L. 63 (2007) (criticizing
the Court of Justice’s approach in double tax cases).
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C. Maryland Could Satisfy Internal Consistency Via Methods that
Would Not Benefit the Wynnes
The principal dissent makes another argument that overlaps with its
argument that the internal consistency test does not eliminate all cases of
double taxation. The dissenters criticize the internal consistency test because Maryland can satisfy it by amending its law in a way that would
not benefit the Wynnes. Justice Ginsburg writes:
Maryland could eliminate the inconsistency by terminating the [inbound] tax—a measure that would not help the Wynnes at all. Maryland could, in other words, bring itself into compliance with the test at
the heart of the Court’s analysis without removing the double tax burden the test is purportedly designed to “cure.”143

Justice Ginsburg is correct in recognizing that Maryland can cure its
constitutional infirmity without reducing the Wynnes’ taxes. Maryland
could resolve its constitutional infirmity by taking any of the following
actions: (1) lowering the outbound tax rate, (2) crediting out-of-state
taxes, (3) raising the domestic tax rate, or (4) eliminating the inbound
tax.144 Any of the four options (and countless combinations of them)
would satisfy the internal consistency test, but only the first two would
decrease the Wynnes’ absolute tax burden.145
According to the principal dissent, the possibility that Maryland could
cure its constitutional violation without directly benefiting the Wynnes
reveals “a deep flaw” in the Court’s internal consistency test.146 The majority responded to the dissent’s criticism by arguing that remedies in
discrimination cases often possess this characteristic: The discrimination
can be cured by leveling up the treatment of the disfavored group, or
leveling down the treatment of the favored group. But the principal dissent argued that the situation was different in Wynne because leveling up
the treatment of the nondiscriminated class by lowering the inbound tax
would benefit only nonresidents in Maryland.147 It would do nothing, in
143

Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1822 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Id. at 1806 (citing Knoll Mason Brief, supra note 25, at 28–30).
145
Id. at 1822–23 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The third option, raising the domestic tax rate,
would also cure the discrimination, but it would not appear to benefit the Wynnes directly
either. That option was not discussed by the principal dissent.
146
Id. at 1822 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
147
Id. at 1823 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
144
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the dissenters’ view, to help residents like the Wynnes, who, according
to the majority, faced discrimination by Maryland against their out-ofstate income.
This criticism fails to recognize that taxes impact competition by
changing comparative advantage, not by changing absolute advantage. It
is true that fixing the constitutional infirmity by one of the latter two options—raising the domestic tax or eliminating the inbound tax—will not
reduce the Wynnes’ absolute tax burden. It would, however, improve
their competitive position. It might be counterintuitive, but the Maryland
tax regime actually disadvantages the Wynnes in their competition with
non-Maryland residents outside Maryland. In our terms, it is retentionist.
As a result, lowering or repealing the inbound tax would confer an advantage upon the Wynnes and all other Marylanders who compete for
income outside the state.
To see why this is so, return to our two-state example from Part III,
where New Jersey represents all states other than Maryland. Residents
of both New Jersey and Maryland allocate investment and work effort
between New Jersey and Maryland. Because New Jersey and Maryland
are the only two markets, a taxpayer’s competitive position in New Jersey depends upon how that taxpayer is taxed in New Jersey relative to
how that taxpayer is taxed in Maryland as compared to how that taxpayer’s competitors are taxed in New Jersey relative to how they are taxed
in Maryland. Accordingly, eliminating the inbound tax would improve
the competitive position of New Jersey residents in Maryland, thereby
worsening their competitive position in New Jersey, thus benefitting the
Wynnes.
In other words, the Maryland tax regime held unconstitutional by the
Court has two effects that go in opposite directions: It keeps residents in,
and it keeps nonresidents out. It is retentionist and protectionist. We
have argued that such bidirectional distortions are the hallmark of tax
discrimination,148 but they are not always obvious. It is obvious that if
Maryland introduced a stand-alone inbound income tax as its only tax,
such tax would discourage New Jersey residents from earning income in
Maryland; the tax would protect the Maryland market from New Jersey
residents. But, although less obvious, Maryland’s protectionist tax
148

See Tax Discrimination, supra note 16, at 1056–60 (referring to a “two-directional distortion”).
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would impact the market in New Jersey, too. By using the inbound tax
to keep New Jersey residents out of Maryland, Maryland makes it harder
for its own residents to compete with New Jersey residents in New Jersey.149 Eliminating the inbound tax would bring more New Jersey residents into Maryland, freeing up opportunities for Marylanders in New
Jersey. The same logic applies when a state imposes an inbound tax on
top of a uniform source tax, which is precisely the Maryland tax system
struck down in Wynne. Thus, despite the principal dissent’s argument,
eliminating Maryland’s inbound tax indeed would benefit the Wynnes
by making it easier for them to compete in New Jersey.
D. The Tariff Critique
Because Maryland taxed the Wynnes’ Maryland income at the same
rate as their out-of-state income, Justice Ginsburg objected that the majority’s use of the term “tariff” to refer to the Maryland tax regime was
inapt. She wrote:
The majority asserts that because Maryland’s tax scheme is internally
inconsistent, it “operates as a tariff,” making it “patently unconstitutional.” This is a curious claim. The defining characteristic of a tariff
is that it taxes interstate activity at a higher rate than it taxes the same
activity conducted within the State. Maryland’s resident income tax
does the exact opposite: It taxes the income of its residents at precisely
the same rate, whether the income is earned in-state or out-of-state.150

The Court uses the term “tariff” to describe taxes that fail the internal
consistency test. Lirette and Viard introduced the tariff analogy in their
work, and the tax economists used it throughout their amicus brief. The
Court adopted the tax economists’ terminology, but it did not explain
why. This Part explains why the tariff analogy is appropriate.
When a challenge is to a state’s tax rates, the internal consistency test
requires a state’s domestic tax rate to equal or exceed its combined outbound and inbound tax rates.151

149

For formal analysis of this phenomenon, see Tax Discrimination, supra note 16, at
1057–60 (analyzing residence-based distortions of competitive neutrality).
150
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1821–22 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
151
See discussion supra Part III.
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If the domestic rate equals the combined inbound and outbound rates,
then the tax system is neutral toward cross-border commerce.152
If, however, the domestic tax rate exceeds the combined inbound and
outbound rates, the tax system prefers cross-border commerce over instate commerce. That is, the state creates a tax-induced competitive advantage for its residents over nonresidents when earning income outside
the state (outbound incentive), and it simultaneously creates a taxinduced competitive advantage for nonresidents over its own residents
when earning income within the state (inbound incentive). Such tax regimes are sometimes referred to as “reverse discrimination,” but so far,
the Supreme Court has not invalidated them under the dormant Commerce Clause.153
The final possibility is that the domestic tax rate is less than combined
inbound and outbound tax rates. In this case, the tax system fails internal
consistency and discourages cross-border commerce compared to instate commerce. That is, the state creates a tax-induced competitive advantage for its residents over nonresidents when earning income inside
the state (protectionism), and it simultaneously creates a tax-induced
competitive advantage for nonresidents over its own residents when
earning income outside the state (retentionism). The amount by which
the state’s cross-border tax (i.e., the aggregate of the inbound and outbound taxes) exceeds the domestic tax is equivalent to an additional tax
on cross-border income (compared to in-state income). That additional
tax can be thought of as functionally equivalent to a tariff on crossborder commerce.
The internal consistency test shows that Maryland taxes in-state
commerce at 3.2% and cross-border commerce at 4.45%. There are
many ways of thinking about Maryland’s additional 1.25% tax on cross-

152

That is to say, apply Condition 1 with an equality instead of an inequality.
See West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199 (1994) (striking down a Massachusetts direct subsidy to in-state milk producers because it was funded by a tax on in-state
and out-of-state milk wholesalers, but declaring that “[a] pure subsidy funded out of general
revenue ordinarily imposes no burden on interstate commerce, but merely assists local business”). But see Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d 738, 741 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated in
part, 547 U.S. 332 (2006) (invalidating under the Commerce Clause a tax credit extended by
Ohio against its franchise tax to DaimlerChrysler in exchange for the company’s location of
assets in Toledo).
153
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border commerce as a tariff, and we consider two here.154 One way to
think about the Maryland tax regime is that it functions as an import tariff. The import tariff emerges when we decompose the Maryland regime
into: (1) a uniform 3.2% residence tax on both domestic and outbound
activities (in Figure 4, the taxes inside the dashed line), which leaves (2)
a residual non-uniform 1.25% tax on inbound income (in Figure 4, the
tax inside the dotted line).

154

We consider only the two extremes here: Either the whole 1.25% extra burden on interstate commerce functions as an import tariff, or it functions wholly as an export tariff.
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Figure 4. Maryland Tax Regime as Import Tariff
MARYLAND RESIDENT

RESIDENT OF
ANOTHER STATE

(1) Uniform residence tax:

ACTIVITY IN
ANOTHER STATE

3.2%
N/A

(1) Uniform residence tax:

3.2%
ACTIVITY IN
MARYLAND

(2) Non-uniform source tax
(import tariff):

1.25%

On this view, the 1.25% non-uniform inbound tax is analogous to a
1.25% import tariff because it discourages nonresidents from engaging
in economic activities in Maryland.
Another way to think about the Maryland tax regime is that it functions as an export tariff. The export tariff emerges when we decompose
the Maryland regime into: (1) a 1.95% uniform residence tax on both
domestic and outbound activities (in Figure 5, the taxes inside the long
dashed line), plus (2) a 1.25% uniform source tax on Maryland activities
by both residents and nonresidents (in Figure 5, the taxes inside the
short dashed line). This decomposition leaves (3) a residual (nonuniform) 1.25% on residents’ outbound income (in Figure 5, the tax inside the dotted line):
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Figure 5. Maryland Tax Regime as Export Tariff
MARYLAND RESIDENT

ACTIVITY IN
ANOTHER STATE

(1) Uniform
residence tax:

(3) Non-uniform
residence tax
(export tariff):

RESIDENT OF
ANOTHER STATE

N/A

1.95%
1.25%

(1) Uniform
residence tax:

ACTIVITY IN
MARYLAND

1.95%
(2) Uniform source tax:

(2) Uniform source tax:

1.25%

1.25%

The non-uniform tax on residents’ outbound income functions as an export tariff because it discourages Maryland residents from earning income outside Maryland.
The preceding exercise underscores several important points. First,
like tariffs, discriminatory income taxes distort production. Discriminatory income taxes distort where people earn income just as tariffs distort
where people produce goods and services.155 Second, tariffs and discriminatory income taxes distort via the same mechanism: They upset comparative advantage. Third, our demonstration that there are multiple
ways to decompose an internally inconsistent tax regime—into an internally consistent tax plus a residual, where the residual functions as a tariff—underscores the importance of considering domestic, inbound, and
outbound tax rates together to assess discrimination. It also highlights
155

Put another way, discriminatory income taxes distort who works what job or owns
which asset; tariffs distort which country produces which goods and services.
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the two-directional aspect of discriminatory taxes. Discriminatory taxes
simultaneously discourage inbound and outbound commerce—they protect against out-of-state economic actors and they retain in-state economic actors. This effect, too, is similar to tariffs, which are simultaneously protectionist and retentionist.
Our exercise in decomposing Maryland’s tax regime into, alternatively, a uniform-source-tax-with-a-residual or a uniform-residence-tax-anda-uniform-source-tax-with-a-residual aids in understanding the tariff
analogy, but it is not necessary for a court to reconceptualize the challenged tax regime in those ways. All a court has to do to determine if the
tax discriminates is to apply the internal consistency test. Economic
analysis shows that a failure of internal consistency means the tax regime functions as a tariff.
E. The State Sovereignty Critique
Justice Ginsburg for the principal dissent and Justice Scalia writing
separately both argued that the Court’s dormant Commerce Clause doctrine compromises state sovereignty. The principal dissent argued that
the Court’s holding in Wynne “boxes in the taxing authority of a taxpayer’s domicile.”156 This Part responds that, by itself, this criticism has little force, since the function of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is to
constrain state power. Moreover, the majority’s renewed commitment to
the internal consistency test helps preserve state tax sovereignty compared to using bald intuition to decide tax discrimination cases.
1. Majority “Boxes In” States
The principal dissent correctly observes that the majority’s decision
implies that a state’s source taxes “box in” that same state’s residence
taxes.157 The internal consistency test precisely states the nature of that
156

Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1813 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. Although the “boxing in” language is somewhat colloquial, neither the meaning nor
the import of the claim is clearly explained by the principal dissent. Indeed, the principal dissent seems to be making two somewhat different claims with its “boxing in” criticism. In the
first use of the phrase, the principal dissent seems to be claiming that under the Court’s reasoning, the manner in which a source state taxes income “boxes in” how another state (that
of a taxpayer’s residence) can tax a resident taxpayer with income from the source state. See
id. Neither the internal consistency test nor the uniformity principle conditions one state’s
taxes (say Maryland’s) upon a second state’s taxes (say New Jersey’s). In the second use of
157
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constraint: A state’s tax on cross-border income (comprised of its tax on
inbound income plus its tax on outbound income) cannot be greater than
its tax on domestic income. In other words, the state’s tax rates must
obey Condition 1: 𝑇𝑑 ≥ 𝑇𝑜 + 𝑇𝑖 − (𝑇𝑜 × 𝑇𝑖 ).158
We are not sure why the dissent considers such constraints to be a
problem, especially since the dissenters’ preferred rule would also “box
in” the states. Rather than arguing, as did Justice Thomas,159 that the
dormant Commerce Clause places no constraints on how states may tax
cross-border commerce, the principal dissent argued that states violate
the dormant Commerce Clause when they assess higher absolute tax
rates on inbound or outbound commerce than on domestic commerce.160
In other words, like the Maryland Comptroller, the principal dissent
reads the constitutional requirement as equivalent to Condition 2,
𝑇𝑑 ≥ 𝑇𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝑑 ≥ 𝑇𝑜 . Like Condition 1, Condition 2 also “boxes in”
how states may tax.161 Thus, under both the Court’s and the principal
dissent’s articulation of the test for tax discrimination, states lack unfettered tax discretion, and a decision by a state about how to tax on either
a source or residence basis will restrain how that state can tax on the
other basis.
Accordingly, the disagreement between the majority and the principal
dissenters in Wynne is best understood as a disagreement over economics: When do state taxes discourage cross-border commerce in a constithe phrase, Justice Ginsburg explains that “[m]y objection, rather, is that the Court treats
source-based authority as ‘boxing in’ a State’s discrete authority to tax on the basis of residence.” Id. at 1822 n.9 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Likewise, Justice Ginsburg asserts that
“the Constitution does not . . . require one State, in this case Maryland, to limit its residencebased taxation, should the [same] State also choose to exercise, to the full extent, its sourcebased authority.” Id. at 1813–14. This latter description of the implications of the majority’s
holdings, that a state’s own residence taxation constrains that same state’s source taxation, is
accurate and so we assume that this second claim is the import of the principal dissent’s criticism.
158
This is true for cases, like Wynne, that involve a challenge only to tax rates in a system
without tax credits. For challenges involving the tax base or tax credits, the analysis is more
complicated. See Perseus, supra note 27, at 419–22. Although the principal dissent does not
mention it, another direct implication of the Court’s ruling is that how a state taxes on a residence basis also boxes in how it can tax on a source basis. Under the majority’s holding, a
state’s source taxes constrain its residence taxes, and its residence taxes constrain its source
taxes.
159
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1811–13 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
160
Id. at 1818 n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
161
Although Condition 1 is stricter than Condition 2, both “box in” the states.
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tutionally relevant way? Maryland and the dissenters argue that states
only violate the Constitution when they assess lower taxes on domestic
income than either inbound or outbound income. But if the goal is to
prevent states from discouraging cross-border commerce compared to
in-state commerce, then the correct standard to use from an economics
perspective is one that compares the state’s domestic tax to the aggregate of its taxes on inbound and outbound income. The internal consistency test is a quick, easy, and reliable way to compare the challenged
state’s domestic tax to the aggregate of its inbound and outbound taxes.
In contrast, taxing domestic, inbound, and outbound income all at the
same rate without providing a credit for out-of-state taxes, which would
be permitted under an interpretation of the dormant Commerce Clause
that required fidelity only to Condition 2, would discourage cross-border
commerce relative to in-state commerce. The principal dissent’s position
would open the floodgates to state taxes that function as tariffs, even
though the dissenters recognize that the purpose of dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine is to prevent such obstacles to the national market.
It is neither a surprise nor a devastating criticism that the dormant
Commerce Clause constrains state taxes. The Court has long held that
the dormant Commerce Clause restrains state sovereignty in taxation.162
We have shown that the internal consistency test reveals whether a challenged state exceeds its tax authority by assessing unconstitutionally
discriminatory taxes that impair cross-border commerce by upsetting
competitive neutrality. A virtue of the internal consistency test is that it
goes no further than necessary to achieve this goal. For example, under
the majority’s analysis and under the internal consistency test, Maryland’s choices about its source taxes constrain its own residence taxes
and vice versa. But other states’ tax rate choices constrain neither Maryland’s source nor its residence taxes. Under a competitive neutrality
conception of nondiscrimination, each state sets its taxes independently
of every other state, but no state may set its source taxes independently
of its own residence taxes, or vice versa.
Thus, the uniformity principle and internal consistency test provide
states with wide, but not unfettered, discretion. States have wide flexibility to set tax rates high or low, to allocate tax liability between residence

162

See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1794.
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and source taxation, and to tax progressively or not.163 At the same time,
there are also clear lines that states cannot cross, where their policies
discourage cross-border commerce relative to in-state commerce.
2. Other Concerns for State Tax Sovereignty
Justice Scalia argued that the Court usurped the role of state and national legislatures by balancing the needs of the national marketplace
against the needs of state governments for revenue.164 Similarly, Justice
Ginsburg argued that:
States deciding whether to tax residents’ entire worldwide income
must choose between legitimate but competing tax policy objectives.
A State might prioritize obtaining equal contributions from those who
benefit from the State’s protection in roughly similar ways. Or a State
might prioritize ensuring that its taxpayers are not subject to double
taxation. A State cannot, however, accomplish both objectives at
once.165

And she concluded that:
This case is, at bottom, about policy choices: Should States prioritize ensuring that all who live or work within the state shoulder their
fair share of the costs of government? Or must states prioritize avoidance of double taxation? As I have demonstrated, achieving even the
latter goal is beyond this Court’s competence. Resolving the competing tax policy considerations this case implicates is something the
Court is even less well equipped to do. For a century, we have recognized that state legislatures and the Congress are constitutionally assigned and institutionally better equipped to balance such issues.166

These quotations illustrate that the principal dissent sees a conflict between fairness and efficiency. In their view, efficiency calls for the elimination of double taxation. In contrast, fairness requires roughly equal
contributions from residents who benefit from state-provided goods and
services, no matter where they earn their income. The attainment of both

163

Perseus, supra note 27, at 417–19.
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1810 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
165
Id. at 1816 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
166
Id. at 1823 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
164

COPYRIGHT © 2017 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

356

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 103:309

would be ideal, in Justice Ginsburg’s view, but it is not possible. States
must choose between them and balance.
We disagree. In our view, the uniformity principle is the path toward
pursuing both goals. As described above, in the dormant Commerce
Clause context efficiency requires uniformity; it requires maintenance of
comparative advantage, but it does not require avoidance of double taxation.
But the uniformity principle does not prevent a state from levying the
same taxes on its residents, no matter whether they earn their income instate or out-of-state. States can even maintain an equal-burden regime
for residents without crediting other states’ source taxes. But to maintain
competitive neutrality, such states must adhere to internal consistency
and Condition 1. Thus, after Wynne, if Maryland wishes to continue to
tax Marylanders’ domestic income and their out-of-state income at the
same rate without crediting other states’ source taxes, it may do so, but
to avoid constitutional infirmity, it would have to repeal its inbound tax.
Thus, there is no necessary conflict between equal treatment of residents’ income and the dormant Commerce Clause.
Although the facts of Wynne highlight Maryland’s role as a residence
state, Maryland is also a source state, and in that capacity, it confers
benefits on nonresidents. The uniformity principle allows Maryland or
any other state to decide how much tax liability to allocate to residence
taxation and how much tax liability to allocate to source taxation. But it
does not allow a state to design its residence tax independently of its
source tax. States therefore have autonomy to allocate tax liability in line
with the benefits principle, but they cannot discriminate against crossborder commerce. Such an approach is consistent with taxing according
to ability to pay because it permits states to tax their residents’ worldwide income with a credit for taxes paid to other jurisdictions, which is
widely viewed as a fair method of taxing individuals.167
CONCLUSION
Wynne is the Court’s most important state tax case in decades. After
narrowing it over the last three decades, the Court renewed and expanded its commitment to the internal consistency test in Wynne. Equally important, the Court acknowledged for the first time that economic analy167

Tax Discrimination, supra note 16, at 1027.
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sis supports the notion that internal consistency is the right test to use for
identifying unconstitutional state tax discrimination because the test correctly identifies cases in which a state’s tax regime upsets comparative
advantage between resident and nonresident taxpayers.
Wynne thus provides a way out of the “tangled underbrush” of
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine to a future with clear, sensible decisions. While there may be some truth in Justice Scalia’s criticism that
the Court’s interpretation of the dormant Commerce Clause prior to
Wynne involved “ad hocery” that “lack[ed a] . . . governing principle,”
the majority’s recognition of the economic principles undergirding the
dormant Commerce Clause places the doctrine on firmer footing. And
the Court’s confirmation that the internal consistency test should be applied to resolve every kind of state tax discrimination case gives lower
courts clear direction.
The challenge of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is balancing
state tax sovereignty against the national interest in a smoothly functioning national economy that benefits U.S. workers, investors, and consumers. By ruling out internally inconsistent state taxes, Wynne clarifies that
balance. Wynne stands for the proposition that states have wide range to
set their own tax regimes, but that flexibility comes to an abrupt end
when a state enacts a tax regime that discriminates against cross-border
commerce. As our analysis shows, a state discriminates against crossborder commerce when it discourages cross-border commerce relative to
in-state commerce. This occurs when it disadvantages out-of-state actors
relative to in-state actors in the competition to engage in economic activity in the taxing state (protectionism) and when it disadvantages in-state
actors relative to out-of-state actors in the competition to engage in economic activity outside the taxing state (retentionism). Such discrimination tends to “balkanize” the national market by dividing it into separate
state markets where residents have a tax-induced competitive advantage
over nonresidents.
To realize the potential of Wynne, however, the Court must remain
true to its central conclusions in the case—first, the problem addressed
by the dormant Commerce Clause is not double taxation, but rather discrimination against cross-border commerce; second, a state discriminates when it uses its tax system to upset comparative advantage; third,
economic analysis supports the use of the internal consistency test to uncover state taxes that distort comparative advantage; fourth, the Consti-
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tution does not establish a priority rule between source and residence
taxation; and fifth, discrimination claims can only be evaluated by examining the state’s full tax system, including its domestic, inbound, and
outbound taxes.

